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Abstract
We examine the implications for the viability of multilateral cooperation of di¤erent legal
principles governing how separate international agreements relate to each other. We
contrast three alternative legal regimes: conditionality - making cooperation in one area a
condition for cooperation in another - separation - forbidding sanctions in one area to be
used to enforce cooperation in others - and open rules, i.e. absence of any restriction on the
patterns of cross-issue cooperation arrangements and sanctions. As an example, we focus on
a scenario where countries can enter into selective and separate binding trade and
environmental agreements with di¤erent partners. Our analysis suggests that conditionality
is more likely to facilitate multilateral, multi-issue cooperation in situations where the
environmental policy stakes are small relative to the welfare e¤ects of trade policies; when
the costs of environmental compliance are high, a conditionality rule can hinder multilateral
cooperation. Separation can undermine cooperation by limiting punishment, but can also
promote broad cooperation by making partial cooperation more di¢cult to sustain. Thus,
how di¤erent linkage regimes a¤ect multilateral negotiations depends on the structure of
cooperation incentives for the countries involved.
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11 Introduction
The increasing economic and social interdependence between nations has intensi…ed the
need for international coordination of policies, both in the economic sphere and outside
it. This is achieved through internationally agreed upon rules of international law, of-
ten embodied in international institutions, such as the GATT/WTO, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD), various UN bodies such as UNCTAD and UNDP, as well as specialized or-
ganizations such as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), WCO, ITU, WIPO,
FAO, and the ILO.
Typically such rules and institutions each focus on a speci…c policy dimension, and
are the result of separate negotiations. In some cases, however, multiple policy dimen-
sions are dealt with by a single piece of international legislation or covered by a single
agreement. For example, The World Trade Organization (WTO) provides the frame-
work for the conduct of international trade in good and services and for the protection
of intellectual property rights. In other cases, agreements and rules in di¤erent areas
remain formally distinct but contain provisions regulating their interaction. For exam-
ple, the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT) allows member countries to
take measures which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests as well as those which taken in pursuit of its obligations under the United
Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. Sometimes
we observe distinct rules and agreements, which contain no formal mention of each
other, coming into being as a result of joint negotiation. An example is the changes in
patent and royalty regulations, energy pricing, and energy supply arrangements that
were negotiated between Canada and the US in the 1980’s concurrently with (albeit
not jointly with) the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (Perroni and Whalley, 2000).
The examples just described represent instances of “linkage” between di¤erent di-
mensions of international cooperation. What does economic theory have to say about
such linkage? One of the key insight that economics has brought to the understanding
of laws and institutions is the idea of Coasian bargaining. This is the notion that,
whatever the initial distribution of legal rights, the interested parties can arrive at a
mutually advantageous (and economically e¢cient) exchange of concessions through
bargaining – as long as the pattern of concessions is unconstrained. If multiple issues
are on the table, then e¢cient bargaining may involve exchange of concession across
2di¤erent issues. Thus, an economist’s idealized picture of the process of international
cooperation consists of a single, all-embracing round of negotiation giving rise to a
single, all-embracing cooperation agreement.
In reality, a number of practical considerations prevent this idealized outcome from
materializing. To begin with, the number of channels through which countries can
a¤ect each other is limited, which in turn limits the possibility of …nding mutually ad-
vantageous forms of exchange; direct cash payments could, in principle, overcome such
limitations, but are in practice seldom used to settle international disputes. Negotia-
tions also entails transactions costs, which become more signi…cant the more complex
negotiation is – with respect to both the number of parties involved and the number
of issues covered; as a result, more limited forms of cooperation may be preferred to
broader agreements. Finally, the issues over which international coordination is re-
quired cannot all be on the table before negotiations take place: new issues arise over
time, and negotiation must therefore evolve through progressive steps, each adding to
(and possibly modifying) previous arrangements.
The actual picture of the institutions through which international cooperation takes
place bears little resemblance to the economist’s idea of a single all-encompassing
arrangement; rather, it is a patchwork of preferential agreements and issue-speci…c
treaties. International cooperation is limited to certain areas: at the time of writ-
ing, for example, there is still no fully functioning international agreement for curbing
greenhouse emissions. Even when simultaneous cooperation across di¤erent areas is
achieved, it is usually dealt with by separate rules and agreements. Not only are cer-
tain areas excluded from existing agreements; countries also are excluded. Membership
in the WTO, for example, is still limited, and there exist a number of preferential agree-
ments (trade and otherwise) involving a small number of partners. In some cases, a
country cooperates with a certain set of partners in a certain are, and with a di¤erent
set of partners in another.
Nevertheless, even if in practice cooperation must be pursued in a piecewise fash-
ion, the results achieved by a given web of arrangements can still be evaluated against
the results that could be hypothetically achieved through a multilateral, multiple-issue
agreement: replicating such an outcome, within the constraints imposed by the given
available instruments and institutions, remains desirable on grounds of economic e¢-
ciency. The question then naturally arises of how cooperation agreements in di¤erent
3areas should be interfaced so as to facilitate the establishment of multilateral coop-
eration across multiple areas, given that possibilities of cooperation in one are not
independent of cooperation in the other. For example, since the Uruguay Round of
GATT/WTO trade negotiations there has been an intense debate over the potential
overlaps between trade and nontrade objectives, especially with respect to environmen-
tal protection and workers’ rights. Should trade sanctions be used to buttress environ-
mental policy cooperation or promote more stringent labor standards? Or should the
GATT/WTO forbid the use of trade sanctions to enforce nontrade agreements?
In this chapter, we examine the implications for the viability of multilateral co-
operation of di¤erent legal principles governing how separate international laws and
agreements relate to each other. We contrast three di¤erent possible legal regimes:
conditionality – making cooperation in one area a condition for cooperation in another
– separation – forbidding sanctions in one area to be used to enforce cooperation in
others – and open rules, i.e. absence of any restrictions on the patterns of cross-issue
cooperation arrangements and sanctions.
To analyze the impact of these di¤erent legal regimes on multilateral negotiations
and the prospects for achieving cooperation over multiple issues, we focus on a scenario
where countries are linked by international trade and transboundary pollution. Follow-
ing the theoretical framework presented in Conconi and Perroni (2001), we describe
a setting where countries can enter into selective and separate binding agreements
with di¤erent partners along di¤erent policy dimensions, and examine the e¤ects of
conditionality/separation/open rules on the robustness of simultaneous multilateral
cooperation arrangements on both trade and environmental policies.
We conclude that conditionality is more likely to facilitate multilateral, multi-issue
cooperation in situations where the environmental policy stakes are small relative to
the welfare e¤ects of trade policies and when partial environmental coordination is
preferred to no cooperation by all countries involved – implying that outsiders can
free-ride e¤ectively on partial environmental agreements. On the other hand, when
the costs of environmental compliance are high but the ability to free-ride on partial
environmental agreements is limited, a conditionality rule can hinder multilateral coop-
eration by making it both attractive and viable for a single country to remain outside of
any agreement. Separation can undermine cooperation because it limits the channels
through which countries can “punish” defectors. However, for the same reason, sep-
4aration can undermine the viability of coordinated responses to unilateral defections
countries, and, through this channel, make defections less attractive. Again, the latter
scenario requires that the incentives to free-ride on an environmental agreement be suf-
…ciently large in comparison with the gains from trade policy cooperation. The broad
message that emerges from this analysis is that one cannot draw general conclusions
about the e¤ects on multilateral negotiations of di¤erent legal linkage rules: whether
the adoption of a certain rule is appropriate for certain areas depends on the speci…c
structure of cooperation incentives in those areas.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 brie‡y reviews
the economics literature on issue linkage. Section 3 examines the impact of di¤erent
negotiation rules on the sustainability of multilateral cooperation. Section 4 looks at
examples of how such negotiation rules are embodied in di¤erent treaties and institu-
tional arrangements. Section 5 brie‡y discusses how taking into account the emergence
of new issues, transaction costs, and the time horizon of policymakers could a¤ect our
analysis. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 The Literature on Issue Linkage
The theoretical literature on cross-issue international cooperation has considerably
grown in size in recent years, but the term “issue linkage” is used in this literature to
denote a number of very di¤erent mechanisms.
A strand of this literature has stressed direct strategic linkages, in the sense that
di¤erent policy instruments may be either close substitutes (meaning that commit-
ments in one policy dimension can easily be undone by adjustments in the other) or
complements (meaning that commitments in one policy dimension are ine¤ective un-
less accommodated by adjustments in the other). Here, there is clearly a need for joint
negotiation: if two types of policies are perfect substitutes, then cooperation agree-
ments reached over a single issue will be fully ine¤ective absent cooperation in the
other. Copeland (1990), for example, examined the case of tari¤ negotiations when
a secondary form of trade barrier (e.g. a non-tari¤ barrier) is set non-cooperatively.
He shows that trade liberalization will induce substitution towards the less e¢cient,
non-negotiable instrument of protection, due to countries facing unilateral incentives
to maintain trade protection. In this framework, the two types of trade instruments
5are imperfect substitutes for each other, and lack of cooperation with respect to one
instrument directly undermines any cooperation achieved with respect to the other.
Issue linkage has also been proposed as a means of handling asymmetries among
countries, when meaningful exchange of concessions can only take place if more that
one issue is involved. As noted above, this idea stems from the more general notion of
Coasian bargaining. It was …rst stressed by Rai¤a (1982) and Sebenius (1983) in the
political science literature, and by Folmer et al (1993), Cesar and Zeeuw (1996), and
Abrego et al. (2001) in the economics literature. Although monetary side-payments
across countries represent a more e¢cient means of facilitating international cooper-
ation in the presence of countries’ asymmetries, issue linkage will be bene…cial when
such side-payments are not available.
Another strand of literature has analyzed linkage in situations where agreements
cannot be enforced by an external authority, and must be therefore self-enforcing
through repeated interaction between countries by the threat of reversion to nonco-
operation. In this context, a linked agreement is one for which a defection in any
dimension of the agreement will trigger a retaliatory response over all dimensions.
Spagnolo (1996) shows that removing the possibility of using cross-issue punishment
strategies by delegating policies to independent bodies can facilitate cooperation if
policy issues are complements in the governments’ objective function, but can hinder
cooperation if policy issues are substitutes. Limão (2000) …nds that linked punishment
under repeated interaction and lobbying can lead to a “reallocation of enforcement
power” from one policy dimension to the other. With reference to trade policies, Ed-
erington (2001) shows that, when countries can use domestic policies as a secondary
trade barrier, a tari¤ is the most e¢cient instrument for supporting cooperation under
repeated interaction.
What most of the contributions to this literature have in common is that they
focus on bilateral relations rather than multilateral cooperation – a notable exception
being Maggi (1999). There exists a literature on multilateral cooperation, but most
of this literature does not examine cooperation across multiple issues. As we explain
below, cross-issue cooperation amongst multiple countries involves forms of negotiation
linkage which are not present in the case of bilateral agreements.
The question of how di¤erent legal regimes, such as conditionality and separation,
a¤ect cooperation has been only touched upon in the above-mentioned theoretical
6literature. In particular, while the implications of separation have been examined with
respect to self-enforcing bilateral agreements (by the Spangolo and the Limão papers),
conditionality has little meaning in a bilateral world – since preferential cooperation is
not an option in such framework – and therefore has not been studied in that literature
on bilateral cooperation.
3 Conditionality, Separation, and Open Rules and their Im-
pact on Multilateralism
In this section, we analyze multilateral policy cooperation choices when international
policy coordination is required across multiple issues. Following Conconi and Perroni
(2001), the establishment of cooperation arrangements can formally be described as a
two-stage process in which binding agreements are formed in the …rst stage through a
sequence of proposals and counterproposals, and policies are selected in the second stage
– cooperatively among countries participating in an agreement and non-cooperatively
between countries belonging to separate agreements.
To accommodate for the possibility of individual countries belonging to multiple
agreements, we draw a distinction between agreements, by which members coordinate
their choices along one or more policy dimensions, and coalitions of countries during the
negotiation phase, which can make coordinated objections to a proposed cooperation
structure. The two concepts are distinct: agreement structures determine the actual
policies chosen after cooperation choices are made; whereas coalitions of players can
object to a proposed cooperation arrangement by proposing an alternative cooperation
arrangement, a¤ecting the structure of agreements – which, in turn, a¤ects policy
choices. A viable agreement structure must be immune from objections, and viable
objections must be not only pro…table for the objecting coalitions but also immune
from further external or internal objections, i.e. they must involve arrangements that
are themselves immune from objections.
Using this construct, we discuss how the viability of a multilateral, multi-issue
agreement (an agreement where all countries jointly cooperate across all policy dimen-
sions) is a¤ected by three alternative legal regimes: conditionality, separation, and
open rules. With open rules, countries can enter into selective and separate binding
agreements with di¤erent partners along di¤erent policy dimensions. This means that
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gotiations. Conditionality makes participation in a cooperation agreement concerning
a certain policy dimension a necessary condition for being admitted as a member to
a cooperation agreement in another dimension; in other words, cooperation must take
place simultaneously across multiple issues, ruling out single-issue agreements. Again,
such restriction will a¤ect both the proposals that can be made and the counterpro-
posals that can be made as objections to a proposed cooperation structure. Separation
concerns the use of sanctions along a certain policy dimension against countries which
do not cooperate along another. In our abstract framework, this means that countries
that unilaterally choose not to participate in a multilateral cooperation agreement
along one policy dimension cannot be “punished” by being excluded from cooperation
in another.
For concreteness, the discussion that follows will focus on a speci…c scenario where
countries are linked by international trade and transboundary pollution. In this con-
text, it has been suggested that multilateral cooperation could be enhanced by formally
combining di¤erent issues with the aim of joint settlement.1 This would correspond to
our notion of conditionality. At the same time, there has been much discussion about
the legality of using trade sanctions in response to non-compliance to international
environmental treaties (see Trebilcock and Howse, 2001). In our framework, a ban on
the use of trade sanctions to pursue environmental cooperation goals – and vice-versa
– would correspond to a separation regime.
As noted earlier, most of the literature on multilateral policy cooperation has ex-
amined cooperation over trade policies and over environmental policies separately from
one another. Riezman (1985), Krugman (1991), Bond and Syropoulos (1996), and Yi
(1996), among others, have focused on the creation of Customs Unions, while Carraro
and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994), and Chander and Tulkens (1992), among others,
have focused on International Environmental Agreements. The broad theme emerging
from this literature is that the presence of spillovers between coalitions (positive in the
case of environmental coalitions, negative in the case of trade coalitions) makes global
1For example, Carraro, and Siniscalco (1994) point out that environmental free-riding incentives
could be o¤set by making the signing of agreements entailing positive excludable externalities restricted
to signatory countries (e.g. trade or R&D agreements) conditional on environmental cooperation.
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countries, is more likely to emerge. In our multi-issue cooperation framework, however,
the e¤ects of spillovers in di¤erent areas become linked, because cooperation incentives
in one area can help support cooperation in the other.
Trade policies and environmental policies involve di¤erent cooperation incentives
and generate di¤erent forms of “temptation” to deviate from a multilateral, multi-issue
cooperation arrangement. When facing global environmental problems, a country may
…nd it tempting to defect from multilateral environmental cooperation, free-riding on
the abatement in global emissions that the remaining countries carry out. In the
case of trade policies, a subset of countries may …nd it optimal to jointly defect from
multilateral trade cooperation and form a preferential trade agreement, exploiting the
resulting increase in international market power of the trade bloc to the advantage of
its members.
In the …rst case, unilateral free-riding may be avoided if the remaining countries
…nd it optimal, once a country has defected, to dissolve environmental cooperation
amongst themselves, which e¤ectively undermines the free-riding attempt. Alterna-
tively, suppose that forming a preferential trade agreement is not attractive if all coun-
tries cooperate in environmental policies but becomes attractive if the excluded country
also chooses not to participate in environmental policy cooperation. Then, a unilateral
defection from environmental cooperation could make a preferential trade agreement
between the remaining countries viable, and a country defecting from environmental
cooperation could thus be credibly excluded from trade cooperation. If the loss from
such exclusion is large enough in comparison with the temptation to free-ride on a mul-
tilateral environmental agreement, then multilateral environmental policy cooperation
could be sustained.
When the threat to multilateral cooperation comes from incentives to form a pref-
erential trade agreement, environmental policy cooperation incentives could come into
play as follows. Suppose that, in the presence of multilateral trade cooperation, a
unilateral defection from environmental policy cooperation triggers a dissolution of the
environmental agreement amongst the remaining countries, and is therefore not viable;
but that, if one country is excluded from trade cooperation, the remaining countries
no longer …nd it optimal to respond to a unilateral defection from an environmental
agreement by fully dissolving the agreement. In such scenario, excluding a country
9from trade cooperation induces the excluded country to abandon environmental policy
cooperation. Then, the temptation to form a preferential trade agreement may be
o¤set by the need to secure broad environmental policy compliance.
Which of the above scenarios will prevail depends on the speci…c structure of en-
vironmental and trade policy cooperation incentives. For example, the presence of an
environmental policy dimension can do little to help support trade cooperation if the
costs and gains stemming from trade policies the latter dominate the costs and gains
stemming from environmental policies.
The preceding discussion of the linkages between trade and environmental coopera-
tion has focused on a situation where there are no constraints on cooperation patterns:
unilateral defections are possible along a single policy dimension, and countries can
respond to defections along one dimension by modifying their cooperation arrange-
ments along the other. The presence of a conditionality rule or a separation rule, on
the other hand, will limit the range of possible defections (objections) and responses
(counterobjections); this will in turn determine which of the above negotiation linkages
can be functioning.
Consider, …rst, conditionality. Starting from a situation where all countries coop-
erate in both trade and environmental policies, a country will face a temptation to
defect from environmental cooperation, but it will lose from being left out of a prefer-
ential trade agreement. If the second e¤ect dominates, then conditionality, by linking
defection from an environmental agreement to defection from multilateral trade coop-
eration, can lock in an otherwise reluctant partner within a multilateral, multi-issue
cooperation arrangement. On the other hand, if the costs of environmental compliance
are large in comparison with the gains from membership in a multilateral trade agree-
ment, then conditionality may not be enough to prevent free-riding in environmental
policies. It could, however, limit countries’ ability to respond to single-country defec-
tions. Given that a country does not participate in the environmental agreement, it
may be in the remaining countries’ interest to limit their cooperation to trade policy
only, dismantling their remaining environmental policy cooperation ties; this, in turn,
could undermine the initial free-riding attempt and induce multilateral compliance.
Conditionality, by tying cooperation in trade policies to cooperation in environmen-
tal policies, makes such a response infeasible, and can thus make unilateral defections
viable.
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Similarly, if two countries are tempted to form a preferential trade agreement,
conditionality implies that by doing so they have to forgo environmental cooperation
with a third country; this may induce them to remain in a multilateral agreement
instead. However, suppose now that environmental cooperation incentives are not
strong enough to lock in the two countries within a multilateral arrangement in the
presence of a conditionality rule. Then, conditionality could constrain the response of
the remaining countries to the formation of a preferential trade bloc, and hence make
it easier to be established.
A separation regime also limits the pattern of possible responses, as conditionality
does, but in a di¤erent way: if a country defects from an environmental agreement,
it cannot as a result be excluded from a pre-existing trade agreement, and vice-versa.
Such separation of responses may undermine cooperation by making unilateral defec-
tions from an environmental treaty less costly for defectors; or, it may have no e¤ect
on cooperation outcomes if the temptation to defect along the environmental policy
dimension is large comparatively to the trade sanctions that would be incurred under
open rules. Similarly, if we consider the temptation for two countries to form a pref-
erential trade bloc, separation could make it unfeasible for the excluded country to
respond by defecting from the environmental agreement, which in turn could make the
formation of the trade bloc more viable. In the situations just described, separation
can hinder multilateral cooperation.
However, it is also possible for a separation regime to produce the opposite ef-
fect. For example, suppose that a country is tempted to free-ride on an environmental
agreement only if the remaining countries manage to maintain environmental policy
cooperation amongst themselves (…nding it optimal to do so), but not if a unilateral
defection causes the environmental agreement to unravel. In this situation, a ban on
trade sanctions could make it more di¢cult to maintain environmental cooperation
amongst the remaining countries and may therefore discourage free-riding in the …rst
place. Again, this can only be the case if free-riding incentives are large relative to
trade policy cooperation incentives.
The overall conclusion we can draw from the above analysis is that rules must be
assessed not just with respect to their e¤ects on defections from multilateral coopera-
tion (the objections), but also for their e¤ect on the viability of coordinated responses
to such defections (counterobjections). In some cases, a rule may limit the temptation
11
to defect – thus facilitating the establishment of multilateral cooperation; in others,
the same rule may limit the range of possible responses to defectors – thus hindering
the viability of multilateral cooperation arrangements.
Conditionality is more likely to facilitate joint multilateral cooperation over trade
and environmental policies in cases where the environmental policy stakes are small
relative to the e¤ects of trade policies, and when partial environmental coordination
is preferred to no cooperation by all countries involved – implying that outsiders can
free-ride e¤ectively on partial environmental agreements. On the other hand, when
the costs of environmental compliance are high but the ability to free-ride on partial
environmental agreements is limited, a negotiation tie-in restriction can hinder mul-
tilateral cooperation by making it both attractive and viable for a single country to
remain outside of any agreement. Conversely, separation is more likely to be an obsta-
cle to cooperation when the environmental policy stakes are small in comparison with
the e¤ects of trade policies; when the environmental policy stakes are comparatively
large, on the other hand, separation may facilitate multilateral cooperation by making
limited forms of environmental cooperation less viable.
If we apply these insights to the current debate about trade and environment, then
we should conclude that a conditionality regime across trade and environmental agree-
ments may be helpful to elicit cooperation for relatively “small” environmental issues;
and a separation regime may be hurtful to cooperation in these cases. When larger
costs and gains are involved in environmental protection – as in the case of policies for
addressing global climate change – then conditionality could be a hindrance to coop-
eration, and a separation regime may actually be appropriate. These conclusions are
consistent with what seems to be a widespread view in policy circles with respect to
global climate treaties, namely that global trade and environmental institutions should
remain separate rather than combined into a single WTO/WEO (World Environmental
Organization) system.
4 Conditionality, Separation, and Open Rules in International
Law
How can the three di¤erent linkage regimes discussed above be embodied in interna-
tional laws and institutions? In this section we examine di¤erent possible approaches
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to the implementation of such rules, and provide examples of current practice.
4.1 Conditionality
Conditionality has often been used in the context of international aid policy. One of
the problems that has a¤ected foreign aid programmes in the past is that it they have
been improperly targeted, with funds often ending in the hands of corrupt governments
rather than being used for developmental purposes. For this reason, since the early
1990s, donors have increasingly made o¢cial development assistance conditional on
political and administrative reform, improved human rights regulation, environmen-
tal protection, disarmament, etc. (see Hopkins, 2000). This form of conditionality,
however, does not correspond the multilateral version of conditionality that has been
discussed above, and is therefore more aptly described as “bilateral” conditionality.
Multilateral, cross-issue conditionality in international cooperation can be achieved
by a negotiated rule restricting membership to a certain agreement to countries which
also participate in another agreement or abide by certain international rules. This can
also be implied by the agenda and format of international negotiations (see Jackson,
1997). In the Uruguay Round, for example, di¤erently from previous trade liberaliza-
tion rounds, it was decided at the outset that the bulk of the multilateral agreements
negotiated had to be accepted as a whole.2 The “single undertaking” of the Uruguay
Round includes, among others, the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), and the agreement on trade
in services (GATS).3 Similarly, certain political groups within the United States and
Europe would like the next round of GATT/WTO trade negotiations in Doha, Qatar,
2Before the Uruguay Round, some agreements related to GATT 1947 had been negotiated during
previous negotiating rounds. In particular, a number of agreements were negotiated during the Tokyo
Round, in the area of non-tari¤ barriers. These agreements, however, were not adopted by all the
contracting parties to the GATT, and were only applied to those countries who accepted to be bound
by them.
3Four speci…c agreements are binding only on those Members who have accepted them. These
agreements, referred to as the “purgatorial trade agreements”, are the Agreement on Trade in Civil
Aircraft, the Agreement on Government Procurement, the International Dairy Agreement and the
International Bovine Meat Agreement (the latter two of which were terminated at the end of 1997).
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to be a vehicle for promoting non-trade objectives – such as labor and environmental
standards, gender equality, or social engineering – jointly with trade objectives.4
Conditionality can also take the form of rules prescribing that violations of inter-
national rules in a certain area be met by sanctions in other areas. Such conditionality
rules can be found to be at work within certain multilateral environmental agreements
(MEAs). For example, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES), the Basel Convention on the trade or transportation of hazardous waste
across international borders, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty do not merely
permit, but require the use of trade restrictions as an instrument of environmental
protection.
4.2 Separation
One way of achieving separation between di¤erent negotiation issues would be to dele-
gate di¤erent policies to independent agents (see Spagnolo, 1996). Governments could
thus “tie their hands” by not allowing agents to condition strategies in one game on the
history of the other. It should be noted, however, that policy delegation is rarely used
with in international economic relations, and that international negotiations almost
always involve government representatives rather than independent national agencies.
One of the main problems with this separation mechanism is that delegation can only
work if governments are able to credibly commit to it, since governments typically face
ex-post incentives to regain control of policies and renege on earlier promises if they
can do so.
An alternative mechanism for achieving issue separation is to explicitly prescribe
separation in international agreements. For example, Article XX of the GATT does
recognize the importance of a sovereign nation being able to pursue certain non-trade
goals even when such action otherwise con‡icts with various obligations relating to
international trade. However, it establishes that the use of trade measures should not
be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjusti…able
4The Bush administration has still not been able to win the “fast-track” trade negotiating authority
from Congress due to the fact that the present bill “falls short in safeguarding labor rights and
environmental standards” (Financial Times, November 7, 2001).
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discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised re-
striction to international trade.” Below, we discuss two examples of explicit separation
between trade and other policy areas – namely, environmental protection and labor
rights – in international treaties.
4.2.1 Trade and Environment
Among the classes of measures listed in Article XX of the GATT, are those “neces-
sary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” (XX(b)) and those “relating to
the conservation of exhaustible resources if such measures are made e¤ective in con-
junction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption” (XX(g)). However,
jurisprudence in this area has established a general principle of separation between
trade measures and global – rather than domestic – environmental objectives.
The application of article XX to the environment was addressed in several GATT
and FTA Panel decisions during the 1980s and early 1990s. The most in‡uential panel
ruling in this area relates to the so-called Tuna-Dolphin dispute between Mexico and
Canada over the extra-territorial application of the US Marine Mammal Protection Act.
This requires steps to be taken to curtail the incidental killing of marine mammals by
commercial …shermen. In 1988 the US government introduced an import ban on tuna
harvested in a way that did not satisfy the standards for the protection of dolphins
applied to domestic …shermen. In 1991 a panel requested by Mexico ruled that the
US ban was a violation of GATT article III, and that the Article XX exceptions in
GATT could not be applied on an extra-territorial basis, i.e. GATT rules do not allow
one country to take trade action for the purpose of attempting to enforce its own
domestic laws in another country – even if it is to protect animal health or exhaustible
natural resources. The reasoning behind this ruling was that, if the US arguments
were accepted, any country could ban imports of a product from another country
merely because the exporting country has di¤erent environmental, health and social
policies from its own. This would create a virtually open-ended route for any country
to apply trade restrictions unilaterally – and to do so not just to enforce its own
laws domestically, but to impose its own standards on other countries. The door
would be opened to a possible ‡ood of protectionist abuses. This would con‡ict with
the main purpose of the multilateral trading system, namely to achieve predictability
through trade rules. The Panel also claimed that the language of “necessity” in Article
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XX(b) meant that a country would have to show that it had exhausted all options less
restrictive than trade before resorting to import restrictions and noted that the United
States had not exhausted the possibility of international cooperation with respect to
dolphin conservation. Given this interpretation of Articles XX(b) and XX(g) by the
jurisprudence, there is little textual basis for the reading that they allow trade measures
to be adopted for enforcing international policy cooperation over global environmental
issues.
There are also about two-hundred multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)
currently in force outside the WTO, dealing with various environmental issues. About
twenty of these include provisions that can a¤ect trade, banning trade in certain prod-
ucts, or allowing countries to restrict trade in certain circumstances. What is the rela-
tionship between the GATT/WTO agreement and these environmental agreements and
conventions? The o¢cial position of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment
is that trade restrictions are not necessarily an e¤ective instrument of environmental
protection, and that the environmental agreements themselves, not trade sanctions, are
the most appropriate way to deal with international environmental problems, possi-
bly in conjunction with helping countries acquire environmentally-friendly technology,
giving them …nancial assistance, providing training, etc.
4.2.2 Trade and Labor Rights
The interaction between trade policy and labor rights is one if the most contentious
issues that the world trading system faces today.5 Critics of free trade have argued
that it is unfair that producers in industrialized countries should have to compete
with imports from countries with much lower wage rates and poorer labor standards.
In contrast, advocates of free trade often view di¤erences in countries’ labor regula-
tions as a legitimate source of comparative advantage or disadvantage. Aside from
competitiveness-based arguments, trade restrictions could also be justi…ed as a means
of inducing recalcitrant governments to meet a given set of labor standards. This may
involve trade restrictions being imposed in the case of a country violating existing in-
ternational agreements such as conventions of the International Labor Organization
5For a discussion, see Hughes and Wilkinson (1998) and Srinivasan (1998).
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(ILO), or to induce a country to adopt new standards or norm.
The GATT contains no explicit provision either permitting or requiring trade ac-
tions against labor rights violations. Article XX(e) permits otherwise GATT-inconsistent
measures “relating to the product of prison labor.” The possibility has been raised that
Article XX(a), which permits the use otherwise GATT-inconsistent measures “neces-
sary to protect public morals,” might be invoked to justify trade sanctions against
products that involve the use of child labor or the denial of basic workers’ rights.
There is no GATT or WTO jurisprudence on the interpretation of Article XX(a), and
on the reference to prison labor in XX(e). However, it has been suggested that the
“fact that Article XX(e) is the only provision explicitly addressing production methods
strongly indicates the other Article XX sections were not intended to include measures
based on other production methods” (Feddersen (1998), p. 76).
The conclusion that Article XX generally implies a separation regime between trade
measures and labor rights issues seems to be in line with the o¢cial position of the
WTO, as re‡ected in the declaration that emerged from the 1996 Singapore ministerial
meeting. In general, the WTO agrees that certain core labor rights should be globally
recognized and protected; however, its fundamental legal mandate is to regulate trade
and international protection of labor rights should be primarily the task of the ILO.
4.3 Open Rules
As discussed in Section 3, the third form of linkage regime – open rules – simply
amounts to the absence of conditionality or separation rules, leaving countries free
to enter into selective and separate agreements with di¤erent partners along di¤erent
policy dimensions, and to use the threat of noncooperation in one area to support
cooperation in another.
This regime can either be implicit, when an international agreement contains no
conditionality or separation rules, or it can be made explicit if an agreement formally
recognizes the possibility of cross-issue linkage. Below, we provide two examples of the
latter. We also brie‡y discuss an area of international law where the application of
an open rules regime is still debated – namely, the legal interface between trade and
environmental agreements.
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4.3.1 Trade and Security Policy
Article XXI of the GATT explicitly allows trade measures to be imposed whenever
a government considers this “necessary for the protection of its essential security in-
terests,” either in time of war or in the case of “other emergency in international
relations.” Sometimes the attempt to invoke a national security rationale is blatantly
unjusti…ed. For example, in 1975 Sweden argued that its import quota for footwear was
motivated by national security concerns, because the survival of its domestic footwear
was a guarantee against possible shortages of army boots in time of war.
GATT rules have been seldom used to contest economic sanctions imposed for
foreign policy reasons. One exception is provided by the United States embargo against
Nicaragua in 1985, which was contested by the Nicaraguan government.6 More recently,
the introduction of the US Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act
if 1996 – more commonly known as the Helms-Burton Act – introduced restrictions on
goods of Cuban origin, as well as possible refusal of entry visas and work permits for
non-US nationals who have business interests in Cuba. This led the European Union
to request from the WTO the establishment of a Special Panel, which was approved
on 20 November 1996; the panel suspended its work in April 1997, after the US and
Europe reached a bilateral resolution.
4.3.2 Trade and Monetary Policy
When the GATT was drafted in 1947, balance-of-payments (BOP) problems were se-
vere both for developing countries and for countries faced with post-war reconstruction.
One of the purposes of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(the World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was to assist in post-war
reconstruction of devastated economies.
Articles XII and XIV of the GATT explicitly authorize certain trade restrictions
when a need related to BOP conditions can be demonstrated.7 A number of legal
6The Panel ruled that the embargo did not violate GATT, and noted that it was precluded from
judging the validity of – or the motivation for – the US action (Jackson, 1997).
7Article XII can be invoked by all Members, while Article XVIII(b) only by the developing coun-
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issues have arisen concerning the interaction between GATT rules on BOP-related
trade restrictions and IMF rules (see Trebilcock and Howse, 2001).
4.3.3 Trade and Environment
Environmentalists often view trade restrictions as appropriate sanctions for non-compliance
with international environmental standards; as a means of imposing such standards
when there are none; or a response to the failure of particular nations to engage in
negotiations to develop such standards. On one hand, the protection of the global
commons is clearly a legitimate concern that should be addressed. On the other hand,
it has often been argued that the measures taken to elicit environmental cooperation
might undermine trade cooperation.
There have been proposals to review Article XX of the GATT in the sense of
allowing the use of trade sanctions in defense of MEAs. For example, in his speech
at the WTO High Symposium on Trade and Environment held in Geneva from 15-
tries(de…ned as those in the early stages of development and with a low standard of living). The
basic condition for invoking Article XII is to “safeguard the [Member’s] external …nancial position
and its balance-of-payments;” Article XVIII(b) mentions the need to “safeguard the [Member’s] ex-
ternal …nancial position and ensure a level of reserves adequate for the implementation of its program
of economic development.”. Both Articles refer to the need to “restore equilibrium on a sound and
lasting basis”. While Article XII mentions the objective of “avoiding the uneconomic employment of
resources,” Article XVIII(b) refers to “assuring an economic employment of production resources.”
Article XVIII:B contains somewhat less stringent criteria than Article XII. Article XII states that
import restrictions “shall not exceed those necessary (i) to forestall the imminent threat of, or to stop,
a serious decline in its monetary reserves” or (ii) “ ...in the case of a contracting party with very low
monetary reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves.” Article XVIII(b) omits the
word “imminent” from the …rst condition, and refers to an “adequate” level rather than a “very low”
level of reserves. Both articles require members to progressively relax the restrictions as conditions
improve and eliminate them when conditions no longer justify such maintenance.
The Uruguay Round Understanding of the Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the GATT states
that contracting parties imposing restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes should do so in the
least trade-disruptive manner and should favor price-based measures, such as import surcharges and
import deposits, to quantitative restrictions. It also describes procedures for consultation by the
GATT Balance-of-Payments Committee, as well as for noti…cation of BOP measures.
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16 March 1999,8 Sir Leon Brittan (then Vice President of the European Commission)
stressed the need to “be more sure than at present that WTO trade rules accommodate
the aims of the parties to MEAs and therefore allow the necessary trade measures to be
taken under such a MEA. If to achieve that con…dence, we need a new interpretation
of, or even a textual amendment to, WTO rules, I believe we should go down that
route.”
It should be noted that trade measures taken against signatories of MEAs pose no
real legal issue for the GATT, as long as the environmental agreement has come into
force subsequently to the relevant GATT provisions. This is due to a general principle
of public international law, whereby in the event of a con‡ict between international
treaties, the provisions of the later treaty apply (art 30(4b) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties). However, with respect to trade measures taken against non-
signatories of the environmental agreement who are members of the GATT/WTO,
the situation is unclear and is the subject of debate. Some environmental agreements
explicitly say that countries that have signed the agreement should apply the rules of
the agreement even to goods and services originating from countries that have not.9
Whether this is in violation of the WTO agreement remains untested, because so far no
dispute concerning the application of such provisions has been brought to the WTO.
5 Additional Considerations
The previous discussion has ignored a number of factors and problems that a¤ect
real-world multilateral negotiations. In this section we brie‡y comment on some of
these additional aspects of international cooperation, speculating on their possible
implications for the comparative e¤ects of di¤erent legal cross-issue linkage regimes.
8See speech 99/47 on the WTO web site.
9This, however, would seem to be in contrast with Article 30(4b) of the Vienna Convention (see
Hudec, 1996).
20
5.1 Emergence of New Issues
Our discussion so far has neglected the truly dynamic nature of multi-dimensional
international cooperation (as distinct from the idea of repeated interaction on a single
issue): changes occurring in the socio-economic environment – technological innovation,
institutional changes, demographic change – have a profound impact on international
cooperation incentives. An example is provided by the relatively new international
cooperation challenges arising from global climate change, a problem which has only
come to the fore in the last three decades and which had deeply a¤ected international
negotiations in other areas. A more recent example is the recent “turnaround in US
foreign policy,” following the terrorist attacks of September 11. “The US, by necessity,
is suddenly involved in the kind of furious diplomacy it abhorred and thought tedious
as recently as two months ago. [¢ ¢ ¢] In his …rst eight, balmy, months in o¢ce, Bush
was happily tearing up the Kyoto Protocol, the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty and
Biological Weapons Convention, and so on. [¢ ¢ ¢] Now he is constantly in talks with the
leaders of other countries.”10
The continuous emergence of new and unforeseen issues signi…cantly alters the pic-
ture of multilateral negotiations we have painted earlier. When a new issue arises
after agreement has been reached with respect to another, an exchange of conces-
sions across the new and the old issues is only possible if the original agreement is
renegotiated. Then, if agreements are binding, the previous agreement would come
to represent the “fall-back” position for renegotiation, and thus a¤ect the outcome
of renegotiation. This means that countries, when entering into cooperation arrange-
ments, also try to anticipate how current agreements might a¤ect the outcome of any
future agreements. Even if we think of international agreements as being not binding
but self-supporting (i.e. continuously renegotiated), the status quo of cooperation may
still be relevant. Theories of cooperation under repeated interaction predict that many
di¤erent outcomes are possible; the status status quo could then represents a “focal
point” determining which particular outcome prevails.
Di¤erent legal linkage regimes may di¤erently a¤ect countries’ strategic incentives
to position themselves within current agreements so as to a¤ect future negotiations
10New Statesman, November 12, 2001.
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in their favor. For example, one could conjecture that a blanket conditionality rule,
forcing countries to cooperate simultaneously over new and old issues, may reduce in-
centives for entering into a preferential agreement on a certain issue in order to secure a
“privileged” platform for negotiating an agreement over a new issue. Separation could
have a similar e¤ect, because it would remove countries’ ability to threaten changes in
existing cooperation arrangements with respect to old issues when negotiating agree-
ments over new issues. More selective conditionality and separation rules, a¤ecting
certain dimensions of cooperation and not others, can be more di¢cult to impose
when issues arise sequentially, simply because new issues are unforeseen and therefore
cannot be selectively addressed by the provisions of earlier agreements.
5.2 Transaction Costs
Our analysis of multilateral negotiations in Section 3 did not account for the existence
transactions costs in international negotiations, costs which become more signi…cant
the broader negotiation is. For example, since the creation of the GATT in 1947, trade
negotiations have become increasingly complex. In the early GATT rounds, where the
focus was mainly tari¤ cuts, and which involved representatives of a few nations only
(twenty-three in the …rst round), negotiations were concluded in a few months. The
increase in the number of GATT member countries and in the number of issues to
be negotiated upon has led to an increase in the complexity, and hence the duration,
of more recent trade rounds. The Uruguay Round involved 117 participants, and its
…nal document, comprising more than 26,000 pages, consisted of no less than nineteen
Agreements, twenty-four Decisions, eight Understandings, and three Declarations.11
The complexity of the negotiations explains why the Uruguay Round lasted from 1986
until 1994. Disagreement over the issues to be included in the negotiations has led to
the collapse of the Seattle Round of GATT/WTO trade negotiations; disagreements
with respect to the negotiation agenda have also started to emerge among the 142
11Decisions were reached in four main areas: tari¤ reductions in agriculture, textiles and apparel;
institutional arrangements covering dispute settlement and the creation of the WTO; trade rules
governing subsidies and countervailing duties, safeguards (VERs) and antidumping; and the new
areas of services, investment, and intellectual property rights.
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countries participating to the new round of trade negotiations recently launched in
Doha, Qatar.
Due to transaction costs, more limited forms of cooperation may actually be prefer-
able to broader agreements on grounds of economic e¢ciency. This means that an
inclusive, all-encompassing multilateral cooperation arrangement is not necessarily an
ideal model of cooperation; which, in turn, changes how the e¤ects of di¤erent linkage
rules should be assessed.
5.3 Self-enforcing Agreements and Myopic Policymakers
As mentioned earlier, one of the questions that has been stressed in the theoretical lit-
erature on international agreements is the problem of their enforcement. In the absence
of external enforcement mechanisms, international agreements must be sustainable by
the implicit threat of reciprocal punishments between the participating parties. This
interpretation typically assumes domestic policymakers to be fully forward-looking.
In reality, international policy interaction takes place between elected politicians who
remain in o¢ce for a limited term. Theoretically, if these “…nitely-lived” policymak-
ers behave as forward-looking welfare maximizers, political turnover should not a¤ect
international cooperation prospects: sharing a common objective, successive cohorts
of policymakers would behave as a single in…nitely-lived player. However, if di¤erent
policymakers have di¤erent policy stances – because of intrinsic di¤erences in their
policy preferences or because of political pressure or lobbying – then such equivalence
breaks down, and the presence of limited terms of o¢ce may not be inconsequential
for whether and how international policy cooperation takes place.
Speci…cally, political turnover implies that policymakers in di¤erent countries ini-
tially have only limited information about each other’s incentives to cooperate, and
must learn about each other through interaction. In…nitely-lived policymakers would
be able to fully infer any relevant information about their opponents from their policy
choices within a …nite period of time – after which they would interact with each other
as fully-informed opponents. Finitely-lived policymakers, on the other hand, have only
limited opportunities to learn about each other, and the need to learn arises contin-
uously as new policymakers come onto the scene. When multiple issues are involved,
such learning may involve cooperation being established or renewed sequentially across
di¤erent issues, with policymakers …rst cooperating in one area to “test each other”
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with respect to cooperation incentives in other areas. In this context, a conditionality
or separation regime would constrain how such learning can take place, and, would,
through this channel, a¤ect cooperation prospects.
6 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined how legal regimes for the interface between agree-
ments in di¤erent areas can a¤ect the prospects to achieve multilateral cooperation. To
compare the implications of di¤erent legal linkage regimes – conditionality, separation,
and open rules – we have focused on a scenario where countries can enter into selective
and separate binding trade and environmental agreements with di¤erent partners. Our
analysis suggests that conditionality is more likely to facilitate multilateral, multi-issue
cooperation in situations where the environmental policy stakes are small relative to the
welfare e¤ects of trade policies; when the costs of environmental compliance are high,
a conditionality rule can hinder multilateral cooperation. Separation can undermine
cooperation by limiting punishment, but can also promote broad cooperation by mak-
ing partial cooperation more di¢cult to sustain. Thus, how di¤erent linkage regimes
a¤ect multilateral negotiations depends on the structure of cooperation incentives for
the countries involved.
We have provided some examples of how these linkage rules are translated into
the letter of international law, and have touched upon certain real-world complications
that a¤ect the process of international cooperation, speculating on how they may a¤ect
negotiations. It should be stressed that what we have o¤ered here are only conjectures:
the literature on cross-issue cooperation in a multilateral environment is still in its
infancy, and no theoretical analyses of these issues yet exist.
Finally, it must be remarked that conditionality and separation rules could them-
selves be viewed as endogenous to the multilateral process, and hence require multilat-
eral support and enforcement. We have noted that such rules are actually embodied
in certain international laws and institutions, but our analysis has said nothing about
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